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The Political Leadership of International Security in the
Middle East
Kelly Worthington

Thesis Statement:
How Post 9-11 American Presidents: George Bush, Barack Obama, and Donald Trump make
their decisions in the matter of international security concerning the Middle East and how their
actions reflect paradigms in theories of international relations.

Abstract
International relations since the end of the Second World War has been dominated by the United
States who promised free trade. This led to liberalism becoming the dominate theory in
international relations, being the major guiding principle in decisions of international relations
made by American Presidents. To ensure free trade amongst nations however, this required a
secure world, leading the United States to act as the world’s police to ensure international
security for global trade. After the September 11th attacks on the World Trade Centers, dynamics
of international relations changed. How Post 9/11 Presidents: Bush, Obama and Trump made
their decisions can be explained using the institutionalism, constructivism and realist theories of
international relations. Despite the major change 9/11 had on the international order, liberalism
remains the dominate theory of international relations.
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Introduction
Research Topic and Question
International relations have been practiced since interstate relations began. It has been in the
form of alliances and at times, enemies. In recent decades, international relations have begun to
take on broader definitions, meanings more relevant to the everyday citizen. Globalization has
taken hold, giving birth to this idea of the global citizen, no longer are international relations
limited to statesmen. With the end of World War II, ideas of world politics, international politics,
international studies, global studies and the like have sprung up in a new global order. This
global order is led by the foreign policy of the United States. At the end of the second world war,
the United States prioritized global and free trade to maintain peace, to prevent a third world war.
The operating factor in maintaining free global trade was securing international seas. This led the
United States to develop the most powerful military the world had ever seen; international
security became the chief export of the United States. But with the events of 9-11, the nature of
international security changed, and sights of American foreign policy in international security
were focused on the Middle East.
At the helm of American policy in international security is the Commander in Chief, the
President of the United States. The Post 9-11, American President operates in a new political
landscape than his predecessors in the Middle East. How do these Presidents make their
decisions in matters of international security concerning the Middle East and how do their
actions reflect paradigms in theories of international relations?
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Importance
The purpose of this thesis is to explain how American Presidents make their decisions in the Post
9-11 world using theories of international relations. Its importance is to provide a guide to
understanding the actions of political leaders on the international stage using theories of
international relations. While world events are volatile and prone to unpredictable change,
theoretical concepts offer a solid basis in explanation of global phenomena.
We live in an increasingly interconnected world. Twenty years ago, a terrorist recruitment video
from the Middle East would likely never reach the households of suburban America. Today with
the rise of social media, a terrorist group such as the Islamic State can write a tweet and send a
message to be read all over the world. Understanding theories of international relations aids in
responding to new technology such as social media on the international stage.
Theories of international relations ultimately provide a perspective on international relations, and
thus an answer to its phenomena. There is more than one way to view international relations, for
instance, the realist will have a different view than the feminist. By viewing the actions of past
and the current Presidents in Post 9-11 America, it can become possible to predict the actions
and consequences of the next President based on his or her perspective in international relations.
Argument and Conclusion
I present and analyze three case studies: President George Bush, institutionalism and Iraq,
President Obama, constructivism and Libya, and President Trump, realism and Iran. I focus on
their decisions in the Middle East, as this is where policy in international security is concentrated
and can provide a picture for the rest of the world.
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I ascribe institutionalism to President Bush and Iraq as Iraq was the first invasion in the declared
War on Terror. To garner support in the campaign against terror, President Bush relied on all
nations and the international institutions in which they sustained, building a coalition of support.
In the case study of President Obama and Libya, constructivism best describes idealism that led
President Obama to support the Libyan people in their resistance against the Gaddafi regime. As
for President Trump, I selected his relations and stance in Iran with his withdrawal from the 2015
Iranian Nuclear Deal, explaining his decision through the lenses of realism.
I conclude by arguing that despite the differences in philosophies, Presidents Bush, Obama and
Trump all make their decisions in international security under the theory of liberalism. The
individual theories ascribed to each President can explain the individual, but the theory that
connects the three Presidents and any future President is liberalism. Liberalism is centered
around economic motivators in international relations and in the end, all three Presidents are
motivated by economics factors: the need to maintain free trade amongst nations. This is a
product of globalism. The unanswered question remains, will the dynamic and influence of
liberalism ever shift, will a different theory of international relations surface as the dominate
force in the international order?
Organization
This thesis is broken into six sections, within each section follows subsections providing details.
Methodology and Limitations
The purpose of the Methodology section is to explain how I go about deciding which case
studies to use to examine the importance of theories in international relations and which
examples pertaining to each President would best describe their behavior in international
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security. There are roadblocks to answering the research question to which I have outlined and
accounted for in the Limitations section.
Literature Review
While brief, the Literature Review section provides a grading on Presidents Bush, Obama and
Trump’s counterterrorism by an expert as well as the importance of geopolitics in international
security. This is to give the reader additional overarching information in international security
when reading the case studies.
Theoretical Framework
The Theoretical Framework section is where the theories of international relations are explained.
To take a holistic approach in my analysis, I provide additional theories of international relations
beyond those I assign to each President. This is to give the reader a chance to critique
themselves, as in international relations, there is no single truth or perspective and to be fair, I am
allowing the reader a chance to form their own conclusions in addition to my own.
To understand the nature of cause and effect in international security, I outline extremism,
violence and change.
Case Studies
I provide three different case studies, each examining a Post 9-11 President and an area of the
Middle East he played a greater role in. I selected Iraq for President Bush as Operation Iraqi
Freedom marked the beginning of the War on Terrorism. For President Obama, I selected Libya
as President Obama was the Post 9-11 President who had to deal with the beginning of the Arab
Spring and Libya marked the greatest of his interventions in the Middle East concerning the
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Arab Spring. And finally, I selected Iran for President Trump as he has taken a staunch position
against the nation, particularly in contrast to his predecessors.
In the Case Studies section, I refrain from discussing theories of international relations and focus
on painting the picture of the political landscape and situation.
Analysis
In the Analysis section, I take the previous case studies and apply theories of international
relations to dissect them and explain Presidential behavior in regard to international security.
Conclusion
In my conclusion, I collect the analysis and case studies and join them together under globalism
to conclude that the overarching theory of international relations applicable to all three case
studies is liberalism. I then pose the question of whether or not this paradigm is permanent or
will there be a change in the dynamics of the international order and how Presidents make their
decisions in international security.
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Methodology and Limitations
Methodology
I decided on limiting my case studies and examinations to the Presidents George Bush, Barack
Obama, and Donald Trump because their decision making in international security is not placed
in the traditional landscape of former Presidents. Presidents Bush, Obama and Trump have
operated in the Post 9-11 world. Their given situations may have been affected by historical
context of the decisions made by pre-9-11 Presidents such as Clinton, H.W. Bush or Reagan, the
players and rules of this game of international chess have changed. Post 9-11 Presidents have
greater powers in a more complicated political landscape than their predecessors.
This does not mean that these Post 9-11 Presidents do not follow molds of international relations
theories, as any political leader in international relations would. In my theoretical framework
section, I explain extremism, violence and change and provide the thoughts of experts on
Presidential foreign policy and the geopolitical situation of the United States. This information is
provided as a prerequisite to understand the context of the case studies. I then provide the
theories of international relations, including theories not used to analyze Presidential decision
making. This is to show that there are multiple ways to view a political leader in international
relations, but in specific cases, there is best way to view their decision making. This information
together lays the groundwork to fully contextualize the case studies and analysis.
In selecting the case studies, I decided to focus on a single world event where the President had
the most influence in his decision making. For President George Bush, this meant Iraq. I decided
on Libya for President Obama. And as for President Trump, as he has presently been in office for

W o r t h i n g t o n | 10

only two years, the options were limited as we have less results to choose from concerning his
decisions in international security, I decided on his relations with Iran.
I begin my analysis by examining the decisions of each President within their case study within
the most relevant theory of international relations. While using only three of the theories of
international relations to assign to each President (institutionalism, constructivism, and realism),
it is important to know the other theories to provide a full picture of theories in international
relations. Finally, I conclude by assigning a fourth theory (liberalism) that intersects all three
Post 9-11 Presidents on a macrolevel analysis. In my conclusion, I explain this in the context of
globalization.
Limitations
There are certain factors that place limitations on this thesis project, they are as follows:
The Volatility of World Events and Time Frame
Due to the dynamic and often changing nature of world events, many of the political scenarios
given throughout this thesis are subject to change in the future. Leaders will at times shift their
policy position when presented with new information. This limitation coincides with the time
frame of this thesis. I will be limiting this thesis to information available as of November 2018.
Future developments and new information may disprove or add circumstances to my case studies
and thus conclusion.
It is almost impossible to predict the future consequences. Data such as statistics and history can
provide a glimpse or a basis for an educated guess into what may happen in the future, but it is
impossible to know what exactly will happen no matter how much information one has. For
example, despite the numerous experts on the Middle East the United States had, no one
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predicted the Arab Spring, much less knowing that it would be started by a shopkeeper
accidently setting fire to himself.
In regard to President Trump’s case study and analysis, President Trump has only been in office
for two years. Because of this short space of time, his positions and limited actions are only
available rather than the results of those positions and actions. Results on President Trump are
considerably limited compared to President’s Bush and Obama.
Access to Information
Important details in matters of national security are often classified, requiring certain clearances
to access them. Information may not be revealed until years after the fact. Classified information
may only be released at the whim of possible whistleblowers or leakers or may be declassified
after deliberation by intelligence officials or the President of the United States. In addition to
domestic state secrets held by the United States, foreign governments hold their own secrets.
Some governments are hostile towards the United States, closing information off from the
general public.
I am also limited to information that I can physically acquire. As all three of my case studies
examine the Middle East, it is impossible for me to conduct a first-hand survey of the peoples
directly affected by American foreign policy in matters of international security. I am limited to
the information I was able to acquire through online resources and books that account for these
experiences, primarily materials written by those who lived these experiences first hand.
Scope
The scope of this thesis is limited to the three Post 9-11 Presidents: George W. Bush, Barack H.
Obama and Donald J. Trump. Discussion of historical precedence not directly related to the
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given case studies and other world leaders will be kept to a minimum and at most, will only be
discussed when necessary to fully analyze the leadership of the Post 9-11 Presidents. Each case
study will examine a President and one country of the Middle East in which they made major
decisions in. They will be discussed in the context of the theory of international relations most
appropriate to them.
Personal Biases
There are multiple ways to understand what is given, there is almost never a simple, black and
white outlook. While I will put in every effort to make this thesis as objective as possible, I do
have my personal biases and worldview. Having served in the military for five years, I’ve seen
the direct effect of the War on Terror on my fellow service members.
Being born in 1993, I was a child with very little understanding or knowledge of world events
prior to the September 11th, 2001 attacks on the World Trade Center. This attack changed the
world, the world I grew up in was the post 9-11 one, the world I grew up in was dramatically
different from the world my elders grew up in.
My personal political beliefs are liberal and have been shaped by my life up until this point.
Despite these personal biases, I am confident that I provide a fair analysis and defend my
positions in all three case studies.
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Literature Review
Introduction
The conflicts taking place in the Middle East since the early 20th century have largely been
political rather than religious. Following the events of 9/11, the United States has launched a
long and brutal campaign across the Middle East in what became known as the War on Terror.
After 17 years of conflict, there have been calls for new strategy and with it, leadership.
Spanning across the Bush, Obama and now, Trump Presidencies. New threats such as
cyberterrorism have risen since 9/11, presenting new challenges. Despite these new challenges,
old geopolitical obstacles have remained in play. Decisions are the building blocks of a strategy,
Former Ambassador to Iraq, Hamid Al-Bayati offers insight into the counterterrorism strategy of
President’s Bush, Obama and Trump.
Ambassador Al-Bayati on the Counterterrorism Strategy of President George Bush
“The reaction of President George W. Bush to the 9/11 terrorist attacks was to launch an
‘International War on Terror.’ This rallied the public. Yet, it was a vague definition that kept the
identity of terrorists concealed and led officials in the Bush administration to claim that the
United States could change many regimes in the Middle East and that they could have armed
conflict anywhere.”1
One vocal critique on the President Bush’s, War on Terror, was how broadly the phrase could be
applied. Ambassador Al-Bayati notes that this campaign title was useful in marketing the war on
terror. President Bush enjoyed a high approval rating after the events of 9/11, giving him the
1

Hamid Bayati. A New Counterterrorism Strategy: Why the World Failed to Stop Al Qaeda and ISIS/ISIL,
and How to Defeat Terrorists. Praeger, 2017. Page 24
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chance to essentially make decisions essentially unilaterally, without much pushback from
Congress. While the war on terror made for a catchy rallying cry, it poorly defined a goal, or
target. The definition of terror could be applied to any person or any state. Calling this strategy
shortsighted rather than a long term comprehensive global strategy, Ambassador Al-Bayati
points out that this worried countries in the Middle East, that they could be targeted by the
United States in its war on terror, even if they had nothing to do with the September 11th attacks.
The broad scope of engagement gave a means to justify enhanced interrogation techniques that
would be considered torture by the Obama administration.
Ambassador Al-Bayati on the Counterterrorism Strategy of President Barack Obama
“Part of President Obama’s strategy for counterterrorism was a reaction to President Bush’s
policies that had caused outrage, concerns, and worries among governments, nongovernmental
organizations, and human rights activists.”2
In other words, President Obama’s counterterrorism strategy was to be the antithesis to President
Bush’s counterterrorism strategy. Where President Bush took a broad definition on the war on
terror, President Obama was more specific, declaring that instead of war with terror or Islam, we
were specifically at war with Al Qaeda. President Obama campaigned on bringing an end to the
wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. President Obama would opt for drone strikes and special
operations raids over land engagements and less precise air strikes. Ambassador Al-Bayati
emphasized the importance of air strikes in preventing ISIS from advancing onto Iraq, noting
that there is no need for boots on the ground. Ambassador Al-Bayati credits the cumulation of

2

Hamid Bayati. A New Counterterrorism Strategy: Why the World Failed to Stop Al Qaeda and ISIS/ISIL,
and How to Defeat Terrorists. Praeger, 2017. Page 26
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President Obama’s strategy of focusing on Al Qaeda rather than the Bush strategy of a general
war on terror with the death of Osama bin Laden.
Ambassador Al-Bayati on the Counterterrorism Strategy of President Donald Trump
“A draft of President Donald Trump’s new counterterrorism strategy demands that U.S. allies’
shoulder more of the burden in combating extremist militants, while acknowledging that the
threat of terrorism will never be totally eliminated.”3
Ambassador Al-Bayati is highly critical of President Trump when compared to his critiques on
Presidents Bush and Obama, he does however, acknowledge that there are positive and negative
points in President Trumps counterterrorism strategy. Ambassador Al-Bayati’s large criticism is
on President Trump alienating the United States from its allies, including Iraq. Stating that this
has given terrorist groups the pretext to portray the United States as a religious crusade,
endangering cooperation from U.S. partners. In other words, the self-alienation of the United
States pushes its friends away and creates an opening for its rivals and enemies, damaging the
counterterrorism defenses put into place since 9/11.
Tim Marshall on the Geopolitical Situation of the United States
“For thirty years it has been fashionable to predict the imminent or ongoing decline of the United
States. This is as wrong now as it was in the past. The planet’s most successful country is about
to become self-sufficient in energy, it remains the preeminent economic power, and it spends

3

Hamid Bayati. A New Counterterrorism Strategy: Why the World Failed to Stop Al Qaeda and ISIS/ISIL,
and How to Defeat Terrorists. Praeger, 2017. Page 27
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more on research and development for its military that the overall military budget of all the other
NATO countries combined.”4
The United States, in Marshall’s words, it situated on prime geopolitical real estate. Having the
advantages of an island nation (such as the United Kingdom did) but additionally being
geographically diverse and large. The United States has access to the European, Asian and
African theaters through the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. While it has access, it can keep
overseas conflict from reaching its shores, since 9/11, no government or group has been able to
launch an overseas based attack onto American shores. Control of the seas is power, it is difficult
enough to launch an overseas attack without taking into consideration that the United States
controls the world’s oceans through its superior navy. The geopolitics of the United States gives
its leaders a strategic advantage in forming their foreign policy on international security.

Theoretical Framework
4

Marshall, Tim. Prisoners of Geography: Ten Maps That Explain Everything about the World. Scribner
Book Company, 2016. Page 89
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Within the political leadership and decision making in matters of international security are key
concepts and theoretical ideas. These include the theories of international relations (including its
objective and subjective theories). Extremism, violence and change in addition to globalism.
Theories of International Relations
Objective Theories
Objective theories of international relations view the world as given, the world can be
understood but not changed. One facet of objective international relations theories is that the
facts can be seen separately from values. Schools of thought within the objective theories of
international relations liberalism, realism and institutionalism.
Liberalism holds the notion that states are the driving factor in international relations. The first
theory, liberalism is organized around the principle of interdependence, international law,
international cooperation and international institutions. The main goals of liberalism are
economic gain and cooperation. Democratic peace, an idea of Immanuel Kant, developed from
liberalism. Describing the nature of affairs between liberal states, or mature liberal democracies,
where there is no war. Liberalism further divides into two factions: idealism and neo-liberalism.
In idealism, cooperation is natural while conflict is not. Ideas and ideals are what drive
international behavior rather than the state. Neo-liberalism is more focused on the international
institutions and argues that international institutions allow states to cooperate within the
international system.
Realism, like liberalism, holds the notion that states are the driving factor in international
relations. However, emphasis is placed on anarchy, quest for power, the security dilemma and
the principle of self-help. The primary goals of realists are survival and the concentration of
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power, protecting the domestic population. The principle of self-help refers to the realist belief
that states are unable to rely on one another. The international system is anarchic and
unpredictable, meaning there is no central authority, states hold sovereignty an autonomy of each
other and will hold military power in an uncertain world. State relations are based on coercion or
consent of one another. For this reason, realists say that survival is a state’s priority and that the
state will act in its own interest. This does not mean the state is anti-diplomatic however, the
state will engage in diplomacy if necessary. As states heighten their military strength, these
actions lead other states to increase their own military strength, therefor creating a need for a
state to once again increase their own military strength, creating the security dilemma.
Institutionalists, much like realists, believe that the international system is anarchic, states are
motivated by self-interests and uncertainty is the primary factor in international relations.
However, institutionalists believe that institutions can overcome the unpredictability of the
international system and thus, cooperation can exist. Institutions bring order, reputation and
credibility to states, providing information on state behavior, thereby reducing any risks or
apprehensiveness associated with unpredictability.
Subjective Theories
Subjective theories of international relations view the world as what we, the society, makes it.
International relations aren’t simply understanding the world, as in the objective theories, it is
criticizing and improving on it. Subjective theories take on a specific point of view and set of
beliefs, they are normative, post-modernist theories. They include constructivism, feminism and
Marxism.
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Constructivism is organized around the principles of norms and ideas. The main actors are the
states, non-governmental organizations, intergovernmental organizations and the people. The
main goals of constructivists are solving global problems, maximizing everyone’s well-being.
Constructivists accept that states act on self-interest and rationality, but varying beliefs and
identities, human interaction and international collaboration are the driving factors in
international relations. Social norms play an active role in international relations, this
phenomenon is known as the logic of appropriateness. Conversely, the logic of consequences
refers to state actions motivated by rationality.
Feminism holds that international relationships are based on power, in a gender-based, vertical
hierarchy. Decisions made by political leaders and their behavior on the international stage stem
from their behaviors in the domestic stage. No decision nor is consequence is confined to
national borders, the international is personal and intersectional.
Marxism views international relations as being governed by social classes and to understand the
international system requires an understanding of a global capitalist system. Due to its
complexity and scale, the social world must be viewed as a whole. Marxists view historical
change as a reflection of a society’s economic development. Core Marxist beliefs are centered
around the means of production and the relationship between workers (proletariats) and the
owners (the bourgeois).

Extremism, Violence, and Change
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Extremism, violence and change is important in the decision making of political leaders in
international affairs and security. Because actions carry consequences, political leaders must
account for and prepare for the fallout of their decisions. The importance of understanding
extremism, violence and change is vital when weighing options in international security.
Extremism
Extremism can be a pattern of thought, behavior or communication of individuals or groups,
typically associated with violence. Extremists can be extremists for nationalistic, cultural,
religious, moral or socioeconomic reasons, but extremists carry five characteristics:
1. They are monistic, extremists hold a single method of understanding reality.
2. They are simplistic, extremists will adopt a simple view of a complex situation, us versus
them
3. Extremists paint viewpoints with colors of morality, good versus evil
4. Extremists are populists. Populism is a major recruiting component, the extremist says,
“I’m one of you”.
5. Finally, extremists are fear mongers, they induce a fear of the other to give their cause a
base.
It is important to distinguish the extremist from the radical. While the beliefs of an extremist are
found at the edge of a spectrum, the radical’s beliefs may not be mainstream, but they stem from
academic investigation. Radicals are willing to deliberate, extremists are anti-political.
Extremists are uncompromising and intolerant of other beliefs. Radicals may be perceived as a
threat to the status quo because they seek change, their analysis is intrinsic.
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Extremism originates from a contraction of authority space, the need to maintain influence over
constituents, a sense of urgency and the fear of losing dominance. If a political leader’s actions
possibly lead to these scenarios, then within their plan must be a contingency for the rise of
extremism in response to their decision.
Violence
Violence is the violation of one’s rights. Violence may be direct or indirect. Direct violence is
overt and interactive while indirect violence is structural – cultural and latent. Indirect violence is
embedded in society. Violence holds an above and below relationship, violence from above is a
force of the status quo or state while violence from below is an act of rebellion. Three theories
are offered to explain violence: intrinsic theory, deviance theory and the frustration – aggression
theory.
The intrinsic theory states that humans are innately aggressive, that we are driven by instinct and
emotion. Opponents argue that this is a gross simplification and exaggeration, we are not
constantly at war. Humans have self-control, can learn and correct mistakes.
The deviance theory suggests that we are not aggressive, and that violence is for outcasts and the
mentally ill. Opponents argue that this theory undermines society’s responsibility for violence.
Limiting fault to the perpetrator limits remedies for violence.
The frustration – aggression theory states that frustration builds up and leads to violence. When
goals are jeopardized by external stimuli, violence ensues. The closer or more vital the goal, the
greater the chances and acts of violence. Opponents argue that most deprived agents do not
become violent.
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Change
Conflict is inevitable in a community, conflict provides an opportunity to improve, conflict
provides an opportunity to change. The dead have no conflicts. Change must be viewed in terms
of systems and complexity. Change is not simplistic nor is it linear. Change goes back and
forwards, top to the bottom and vice versa of power structures. Change is a study of cause and
effect, change is complex and requires intrinsic analysis to be accounted for. The antithesis of
violence and extremism, political leaders seek either change or sustainment with the results of
their decisions.
Protest is a method used by the constituents to voice frustrations to a political leader. The
essence of protest is disruption, the final goal being social change. Pressuring political leaders
and power structures to legislate and enforce change. Protests are difficult to sustain, according
to the Stanford Threshold Model, everyone has a threshold of their willingness to join political
activism. Protesters are comprised of everyday people who must work jobs to sustain
themselves, they do not have the luxury of maintaining a protest indefinitely. The status quo on
the other hand, has the power of the state, professional guards who are paid and trained to resist
protesters, capable of resisting indefinitely.
There are impediments to change that protesters must contend with. Impediments such as culture
and tradition as well as the protest dilemma. The protest needs the support of the people.
Organizers must find balance between disruption and not losing support by alienating
themselves. The authorities know this and attempt to paint the protesters as riff raffs and
hooligans to alienate them.
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A successful protest is nonviolent and democratic. Violence alienates the protest as an extremist
movement. It is diverse and large, bringing to light issues that transverse class. It is enduring
with clear goals, organized to keep bringing others into the cause.
Norms bring stability to society, setting what is appropriate behavior. Norms unify and regulate
the people, constraining options outside of the norms. They can be regulative (to bring order),
constructive (meant to create new actors) and evaluative (what ought to be the norm). Political
change must challenge the norm, the change cannot be to great and sudden, or it could cause a
relapse in society, causing civil unrest.
Using the Four Power Model, political leaders can create support for change. A comprehensive
approach to develop, organize and act.
1. Power Within
a. This is self-confidence of the political leader or of the individual. It is the sense
that we can bring change
2. Power With
a. This is collective power, organizing and solidarity. The confidence of a group to
bring change.
3. Power To
a. This is the ability to decide on what must be done and carry the action out. It
connects hopes and dreams with action
4. Power Over
a. This is the ability to win others over and persuade them to be empathetic to the
cause. It is hierarchy and control.
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Change is a natural part of the political process, with it comes an opportunity to improve. Those
in power may resist domestic change as it poses a potential threat to their own power. In the
world of international affairs and security, a political leaders’ choices are always meant to bring
change.
Globalism
Globalization refers to the procession of globalism, the concept of increasing international
connectedness. Globalism became a major facet of world affairs after the second World War
with nation-states, trade and international organizations. Technologies such as the internet and
social media have connected individuals across the globe, giving rise to the international or
global citizen and thus the spread of globalism.
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Case Studies
Introduction
The United States has long been involved in Middle Eastern affairs. In the early 20th century,
American involvement in the Middle East was limited where British and French foreign policy
was the primary Western influence on the Middle East. This changed towards the end of World
War II, with Europe in ruins and the Middle East in political turmoil, the United States was
poised to become the dominate superpower in Middle Eastern affairs. Prior to the September
11th, 2001 attacks launched by Al-Qaeda, the Middle East was largely a Cold War battleground.
Post 9/11, we would see the evolution of the War on Terror, spanning 17 years and 3
Presidencies with seemingly no viable end in sight.
In the War on Terror era, I have selected a case study on each President (Presidents Bush,
Obama and Trump) and a key area of their foreign policy in the Middle East. Theories of
international relations can explain their decision-making behavior. For President George Bush, I
shall be examining his actions in Iraq and institutionalism. For President Barack Obama, I will
be examining his policies in Libya and liberalism. And finally, for President Donald Trump, I
will be examining his policies concerning Iran and realism. For all three Presidents, I will
analyze their relationship in the War on Terror.
Case Study #1: President George Bush and Iraq
On March 19, 2003, President George W. Bush launched Operation Iraqi Freedom as part of the
War on Terror in response to the September 11th attacks by Al-Qaeda in 2001, thus beginning the
war in Iraq.
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“I turned to Don Rumsfeld. ‘Mr. Secretary, for the peace of the world and the benefit and
freedom of the Iraqi people, I hereby give the order to execute Operation Iraqi Freedom’… For
more than a year, I tried to address the threat from Saddam Hussein without war. We had rallied
an international coalition to pressure him to come clean about his weapons of mass destruction
programs. We had obtained a unanimous United Nations Security Council resolution making
clear there would be serious consequences for continued defiance. We had reached out to Arab
nations about taking Saddam into exile. I had given Saddam and his sons a final forty-eight hours
to avoid war. The dictator rejected every opportunity. The only logical conclusion was that he
had something to hide, something so important that he was willing to go to war for it.”5
President Bush’s decision to invade Iraq can be best explained by the international relations
theory of institutionalism. Institutionalists rely on institutional structures to overcome challenges
and the unpredictability of an anarchic international system and foster cooperation amongst
states. The Saddam Hussein regime was representative of the anarchy of the international system
of which President Bush responded to. Saddam was accountable to no one, motivated by his own
self-interest. The institutionalist response to Saddam would be to organize a coalition of
international organizations and governments to put a check on Saddam Hussein. In the case of
President Bush and his decision to invade Iraq, key institutions included the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO), the United Nations (UN), and the European Union (EU).
The UN enacted international laws against Iraq via its United Nations Security Council (UNSC)
resolutions. The UNSC had passed resolutions against Iraq in the past for the Iran-Iraq War and
Persian Gulf War before finally passing resolution 1441 which provided Iraq with “a final

5
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opportunity to comply with its disarmament obligations”6. With Iraq’s failure to comply with
resolution 1441, President Bush would move forward with institutionalist policy making in his
decision to invade Iraq with the backing of the EU and NATO forces.
Self-interest and uncertainty are the prime factors in international relations under
institutionalism. Saddam was a poster of these two factors in his thirst for power and the
uncertainty felt by the Bush administration along with the rest of the world as to whether Saddam
possessed weapons of mass destruction and whether those weapons could fall into the hands of
terrorist groups.
Case Study #2: President Barack Obama and Libya
The Arab Spring began with protests against poor living conditions, oppressive and authoritarian
governments in Tunisia in 2010. These Tunisian protests would spread across the Arab world,
notably into Libya. Libya had been under the control of Colonel Maummar Gaddafi for 40 years
before the Arab Spring reached Libya in 2011. The protests in Libya would escalate when during
a protest in Benghazi which ended with security firing on the civilians, this would mark the
Libyan Civil War, a war between Gaddafi’s forces and those who wanted democracy for Libya,
who would form a temporary government known as the National Transitional Council (NTC).
In a speech given at the National Defense University, President Obama had declared his support
for the Libyan people and opposition to the Gaddafi regime, “We had a unique ability to stop that
violence: an international mandate for action, a broad coalition prepared to join us, the support of
Arab countries, and a plea for help from the Libyan people themselves.”7 A majority of Libyans
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(54%) approved of President Obama’s leadership following the fall of Gaddafi according to a
2012 Gallup poll.8
On February 26th and March 17th, 2011, the UNSC adopted Resolutions 1970 and 1973
respectively. Key demands under the resolutions included establishment of a no-fly zone over
Libya, a ceasefire of violence against civilians, a weapons embargo, a freeze on assets owned by
authorities of the Libyan government and tightened sanctions on the Gaddafi regime.910 The
resolutions would be carried out and enforced by a NATO lead coalition. The American role,
under President Obama, would be code named Operation Odyssey Dawn for the implementation
of a no-fly zone and afterwards would be code named Operation Unified Protector, carrying out
the arms embargo via air strikes and naval blockades.
Leading up to the end of the civil war, Gaddafi was being pushed into a corner and announced
willingness to negotiate with the NTC, to which the NTC declined. On October 20th, Gaddafi
would be captured by rebels after fleeing from a NATO attack where he would be beaten and
ultimately killed.
On September 11th, 2012, year after the fall of Gaddafi, militants raided a United States embassy
in Benghazi, killing 4 Americans which included Ambassador Stevens. In 2014, the United
States State Department would advise American citizens in Libya to leave the country and would
place Libya on a level 4 travel advisory (do not travel), due to high levels of crime, terrorism,
civil unrest and armed conflict, a warning still in place as of August 2018.11 The region continues
8
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to contend with instability after the death of Gaddafi as the threat of a new civil war grows with
pockets of fighting as the newly established government “struggles to rein in the country’s
militias.”12 and the presence of the Islamic State of Iraq and Libya (ISIL).
Case Study #3: President Donald Trump and Iran
In 2015, Iran along with the Germany and the permanent members of the United Nations
Security Council: The United States, United Kingdom, France, Russia and China (known as
P5+1), reached a long-term agreement on Iran’s nuclear program. Under the Joint
Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) or the Iranian Nuclear Deal, as it came to be known,
Iran would limit its nuclear activities and allow inspections of its nuclear facilities by the global
nuclear watchdog, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), monitoring Iran’s declared
nuclear sites and verifying that no fissile material had been moved covertly to a secret location in
order to build a bomb. In addition, the IAEA would have access to any site in the country they
deemed suspicious. In return, economic sanctions imposed by the United States, European Union
and United Nations would be lifted. Previous sanctions had cost Iran $160 billion in oil revenue
from 2012 to 2016 and had frozen over $100 billion in assets. Iran’s Uranium Stockpile would
have been reduced by 98% to 300kg for 15 years. Low-enriched uranium, which has a 3%-4%
concentration of U-235, can be used to produce fuel for nuclear power plants. Weapons-grade
uranium is 90% enriched. In July 2015, Iran had almost 20,000 centrifuges. Under the JCPOA, it
was limited to installing no more than 5,060 of the oldest and least efficient centrifuges at Natanz
until 2026 - 15 years after the deal's implementation in January 2016.13
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In 2015, then Presidential Candidate Trump would call upon Congress to stop the Iranian
Nuclear Deal, calling it a “direct national security threat”14, signaling his realist approach to
international relations with Iran. Due to the threat that Iran poses to Israel, President Trump
believed that the JCPOA would lead to Iran acquiring nuclear weapons due to a poor oversight of
its nuclear facilities and pose an even greater threat to Israel.
In May of 2018, President Trump would withdraw the United States from the Iranian Nuclear
Deal and restore the sanctions the United States had lifted as part of the deal. Despite the
withdrawal of the United States, this would not spell the end of the deal, as it was a deal between
the P5+1 countries and Iran, not solely the United States an Iran. If the other member states of
the deal adhered to the conditions of the deal, President Rouhani has agreed to continue to abide
by the terms of JCPOA.
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Analysis

Introduction
Institutionalism, constructivism and realism are theories of international relations that can best
explain the international security policies of Presidents Bush, Obama and Trump. It is important
to know of other theories of international relations (such as feminism and Marxism) in order to
contextualize Presidents Bush, Obama and Trump. In my analysis of President Bush, Obama and
Trump, I examine the efficiency of their theoretical approaches to international security. While
institutionalism, constructivism and realism can best describe the aforementioned Presidents on
the micro level, these three theories of international relations do not explain the greatest common
factor between them: the economic factor. I therefore conclude that liberalism provides best
macro level explanation of their decisions in matters of international security.
Analysis: President Bush, Institutionalism and the War on Terror
It was President Bush who initially declared the War on Terror in 2001 in response to the AlQaeda attacks on the Pentagon and World Trade Center. In a speech before Congress, President
Bush called for all nations of the world to join the United States in its campaign on the war on
terror, stating that "Every nation, in every region, now has a decision to make. Either you are
with us, or you are with the terrorists."15, demanding more than neutrality from other nations.
The War on Terror itself was poorly and broadly defined. Former Iraqi Ambassador, Dr. Hamid
Al-Bayati explains, “it was a vague definition that kept the identity of terrorists concealed and
led officials in the Bush administration to claim that the United States could change many
15
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regimes in the Middle East and that they could have armed conflict anywhere”16. The Bush
administration argued for the war in Iraq by three main points17:
1. Saddam Hussein potentially had weapons of mass destruction.
2. Saddam Hussein could put these weapons of mass destruction in the hands of terrorist
groups such as Al-Qaeda.
3. To liberate the Iraqi people from Saddam Hussein’s oppressive and dictatorial rule.
An institutional international system does not mean that all states will agree with one another,
even when they are members of the same international institution. France and Germany for
example, opposed military action in Iraq despite being members of NATO and the EU. French
President Jacques Chirac pushed back against President Bush’s decision to invade Iraq by
supporting a request made by the UN’s chief nuclear weapons inspector, Mohamed ElBaradei for
more time to search for weapons of mass destruction in Iraq.
Institutionalism relies on the credibility of the institutions. Congress would conclude that
Saddam had no weapons of mass destruction and that his refusal to cooperate with UN inspectors
was the result of Saddam wanting to project an illusion of power. In a list of conclusions by the
United States Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, “Most of the major key judgements in
the Intelligence Community’s October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE), Iraq’s
Continuing Programs for Weapons of Mass Destruction, either overstated, or were not supported
by, the underlying intelligence reporting. A series of failures, particularly in analytical trade
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craft, led to the mischaracterization of the intelligence”.18 The intelligence provided in the 2002
NIE (a report prepared by ten different intelligence agencies) was the basis in President Bush’s
decision to use military action in Iraq in 2003.
The weakness of institutionalism is when the institutions themselves are incompetent or
unreliable. President Bush’s decision to invade Iraq would lead to a conflict and arguably
worsened instability that would last for the next 17 years with a death toll of over half a
million.19 States are motivated by self-interests and are subject to being incompetent and by
extension, the institutions of those states can be motivated by self-interest and are subject to
incompetencies as well. cannot account for state behavior because the institutions are underneath
the states rather than the states being underneath the institutions. The UN, for example, has no
independent power and derives its authority from its member states. If the UN passes a resolution
and no states enforce it or abide by it, there is very little the institution of the UN can do in terms
of issuing consequences. After an examination of President Bush’s decision to launch
1Operation Iraqi Freedom and the subsequent failure of meeting its goals, I believe that
institutionalism is an incorrect manner of conducting international relations.
Analysis: President Obama, Constructivism and Post Civil War Libya
Institutionalism could be used to explain President Obama’s decision to intervene in the Libyan
civil war for his use of the UN and a NATO coalition, however institutionalism would fail to
adequately explain the philosophy and the weak points of President Obama’s policy in Libya
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even after the fall of Gaddafi. Constructivism best serves to analyze Obama policy towards
Libya.
Constructivism expands on the philosophies of realism and liberalism. Like liberalism and
realism, the states are still main actors but non-governmental organizations (NGOs),
intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) and the people are the central actors. Like realism, it is
accepted by constructivists that states act on self-interests. What sets constructivists apart from
the liberals who are concerned economics and the realists who are concerned with survival is that
constructivists are concerned with global issues, rationality and the well-being of the people.
In 2009, President Obama would win the Nobel Peace Prize “his extraordinary efforts to
strengthen international diplomacy and cooperation between peoples”.20 During his 2008
Presidential campaign, Candidate Obama made promises of hope and change and his
interventions in Libya were popular amongst the Libyan people who wanted change from the
Gaddafi dictatorship towards a democratic government. The Libyan revolution was a people’s
revolution, human interaction (the protests on the ground against Gaddafi by the Libyan people)
and international collaboration (the extensive role NATO played) are driving factors in
international relations according to constructivist doctrine.
However, Libya would descend into chaos after Western intervention despite President Obama’s
principles of constructivism. In a 2016 Fox News interview with Chris Wallace, President
Obama would express regret over Libya for “failing to plan for the day after what I think
was the right thing to do in intervening in Libya,”21. While not believing that intervention
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itself was wrong, President Obama believes that he and European leaders failed to account for
the aftermath of Gaddafi’s fall from power. Therein lay the flaw in constructivism and President
Obama’s plans for Libya. The constructivist approach does not adequately account for rogue,
outside interventions, politics or groups in international relations. Similar to how withdrawing
from Iraq created a vacuum for the Islamic State to grow in Iraq, the toppling of Gaddafi created
a vacuum for political instability in Libya, allowing groups who do not share the constructivists
beliefs of international collaboration and human interaction to disrupt the state of Libya.
Analysis: President Trump, Realism and Iran
In a phrase, I would describe President Trump as the anti-institutional realist. President Trump
vehemently rejects the role of institutions. This is in a noticeably stark contrast to his Republican
predecessor, President Bush, who embraced institutions to garner support for Operation Iraqi
Freedom and the War on Terror. Compared to Presidents Bush and Obama, who could be
described more flexibly with other theories of international relations aside from the theories I
prescribed to them, President Trump is strictly a realist. I don’t believe this to be coincidence and
was one of the main reasons he acquired such strong support from his base, President Trump was
a departure from the institutionalist George Bush or the constructivist Barack Obama. Realism
was anti-establishment and populist theory of international relations as presented by Donald
Trump during his 2016 Presidential campaign.
A realist does not believe in institutions as a guarantee against an opposing state interests and
unpredictability in the international system. The Iranian Nuclear Deal was an institutionalist
agreement, an inherently went against the philosophy of a realist in international relations. By
providing Iran with the ability to develop its nuclear capability (even if in only for research
purposes), President Trump as a realist would have been subjected to the security dilemma.
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States are motivated by their own self-interests and since Iran is opposed to Israel, an ally of the
United States, Iran cannot be trusted to not develop its nuclear capability to pose a threat to
Israel. Due to the security dilemma, President Trump would be forced to further develop the
nuclear capability of the United States to counter a possible nuclear Iran.
Alex Ward of Vox News provides three reasons as to why President Trump left the nuclear
deal22 these reasons highlight the realist theory of international relations used by President
Trump:
1. Iran works as an enemy of the United States, which President Obama failed to address in
the deal.
2. Restrictions such as Iran having the ability to enrich uranium and us centrifuges are lifted
in the deal.
3. President Trump believes he can come up with a better deal.
Realists say that survival is a state’s top priority, this doesn’t exclude diplomacy in state
relations. While President Trump prioritizes military strength, he is not anti-diplomatic and
believes he makes the best deals.23 While open to diplomacy on his terms, state relations are
ultimately based on coercion and consent in realism, which is why President Trump reinstated
and placed harsh sanctions against Iran. Influenced by realists such as National Security Advisor,
John Bolton, President Trump has made use of the stick rather than the carrot in international
relations. Realism has been the guiding principle in President Trump’s foreign policy, including
matters not related to Iran, such as relations with European and North American allies compared
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to adversaries such as Russia and North Korea. The enemy of my enemy is my friend, that is
diplomacy in the realist framework.
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Conclusion
The decisions made by Presidents Bush, Obama and Trump are reflections of paradigms of
theories in international relations. Despite the near dramatic differences between the three
Presidents and their strategies of foreign policy, American foreign policy has largely looked the
same since President Bush assumed office in January 2001. We’re still involved in conflicts in
the Middle East, particularly Iraq and Afghanistan. Conflicts across the Middle East have only
worsened since 9/11, to include multiple civil wars and the rise of the Islamic State. Even though
President Obama attempted to reduce the presence of the United States in the Middle East, he
was ultimately forced to stay. The same could be said for trade, the international trade policies of
Presidents Bush and Obama being essentially one in the same in terms of working for the
average American. President Trump has attempted to change how the United States conducted
international trade, notably through his trade war with China. But with the upsets and blocks he’s
faced, it seems that President Trump is only par for course in typical American foreign policy,
even his newly revised North Atlantic Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) is essentially the old
deal with provisions from the Tran-Pacific Partnership (TPP) included. It isn’t coincidence that
despite their different theoretical approaches to international relations, American foreign policy
looks the same between the three Presidents.
American foreign policy since the end of World War II and the start of the Cold War, has
followed a certain formula: Free trade maintained through international security in effort to
maintain peace. This was the philosophy behind President Truman’s 1949 Presidential Inaugural
Address, securing the world by the expansion of trade, “we must carry out our plans for reducing
the barriers to world trade and increasing its volume. Economic recovery and peace itself depend
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on increased world trade”.24 In this sense, liberalism has been the overall driving theory of
American international relations and it has, for most of the part, been efficient in preserving
international security. For instance, once common hostilities in Europe have waned since the
implementation of the Marshall Plan nor has there been a World War III. This expansion of trade
and global security can be attributed to globalism.
Globalism refers to the political and social interconnectedness of the international community
(the term globalization refers to the process of globalism). Liberalism leads to globalism. Since
the end of the second world war, American Presidents have shaped their foreign policy around
globalization. These policies have stretched President Truman’s efforts to lower trade barriers,
establishment of the International Trade Organization (ITO) and the signing of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), to President Clinton’s NAFTA and President Obama’s
proposed TPP, which never passed although previsions of the TPP were included in President
Trump’s revised NAFTA deal.
Liberalism and neoliberalism offer a macro explanation of how Presidents George Bush, Barack
Obama and Donald Trump have made their decisions in matters of international security
concerning the Middle East. Institutionalism, constructivism and realism can explain the foreign
policy of Presidents Bush, Obama and Trump respectively, however these theories of
international relations do not capture the economic factors of their foreign policy that intertwine
with one another. Economics matter in topics of international security, for example the migrant
refugees are fleeing from Central America in part due to poverty caused by the effects of climate
change on farmland or the stability of oil and oil prices from the Middle East. These issues are
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intersectional and will continue to affect the international security decisions of future Presidents
of the United States.
The trend of liberalism in American foreign policy and the marriage of international security and
trade began at the end of World War II when Europe and Japan lay in ruins and the once former
allies, the United States and Soviet Union, saw an opening to establish a new world order as that
new world’s dominate superpower. The resulting cold war would put liberal capitalism against
communism. Without the events of World War II, many of the international institutions of the
liberal order would not exist (such as the United Nations, North Atlantic Treaty Organizations,
The World Bank, The International Monetary Fund). With the end of World War II,
globalization, a phenomenon of liberalism, began. While individual Presidents have their own
approaches to international security and foreign policy, their approach is often within the
framework of liberalism. This is our destiny, ascribed by history.
Final Thoughts
What remains to be answered is whether or not American foreign policy in international security
will always be bound to globalism and liberalism. Is it possible for the liberalism to be replaced
as the dominate theory of international relations used to describe the behavior of American
Presidents in the Middle East and going further, the world? What would need to change for the
liberal order to be replaced. With populism and far right movements rising in pockets around the
world, is this a threat to liberalism in international security?
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